### a/t: we’ll cling to power

**1). This doesn’t take out our impact turns- they are about the balance of power trying to have power does not mean that recalcitrant powers would be unsatisfied with the new status quo or threatened**

**2).** **Policymakers won’t hold on to heg**

**Macdonald and Parent 11** \* Paul-**Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami [November/ December 2011, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment”** <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136510/joseph-m-parent-and-paul-k-macdonald/the-wisdom-of-retrenchment>]

Others warn that the U.S. political system is too fragmented to implement a coordinated policy of retrenchment. In this view, even if the foreign policy community unanimously subscribed to this strategy, it would be unable to outmaneuver lobbying groups and bureaucracies that favor a more activist approach. Electoral pressures reward lucrative defense contracts and chest-thumping stump speeches rather than sober appraisals of declining fortunes. Whatever leaders' preferences are, bureaucratic pressures promote conservative decisions, policy inertia, and big budgets -- none of which is likely to usher in an era of self-restraint. Despite deep partisan divides, however, Republicans and Democrats have often put aside their differences when it comes to foreign policy. After World War II, the United States did not revert to the isolationism of earlier periods: both parties backed massive programs to contain the Soviet Union. During the tempestuous 1960s, a consensus emerged in favor of détente with the Soviets. The 9/11 attacks generated bipartisan support for action against al Qaeda and its allies. Then, in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, politicians across the spectrum recognized the need to bring the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to an end. When faced with pressing foreign policy challenges, U.S. politicians generally transcend ideological divides and forge common policies, sometimes expanding the United States' global commitments and sometimes contracting them. Today, electoral pressures support a more modest approach to foreign affairs. According to a 2009 study by the Pew Research Center, 70 percent of Americans would rather the United States share global leadership than go it alone. And a 2010 study by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 79 percent of them thought the United States played the role of world policeman more than it should. Even on sacrosanct issues such as the defense budget, the public has demonstrated a willingness to consider reductions. In a 2010 study conducted by the Program for Public Consultation at the University of Maryland, 64 percent of respondents endorsed reductions in defense spending, supporting an average cut of $109 billion to the base-line defense budget. Institutional barriers to reform do remain. Yet when presidents have led, the bureaucrats have largely followed. Three successive administrations, beginning with that of Ronald Reagan, were able to tame congressional opposition and push through an ambitious realignment program that ultimately resulted in the closure of 100 military bases, saving $57 billion. In its 2010 defense budget, the Obama administration succeeded in canceling plans to acquire additional F-22 Raptors despite fierce resistance by lobbyists, members of Congress, and the air force brass. The 2010 budget also included cuts to the navy's fleet of stealth destroyers and various components of the army's next generation of manned ground vehicles. Thus, claims that retrenchment is politically impractical or improbable are unfounded. Just as a more humble foreign policy will invite neither instability nor decline, domestic political factors will not inevitably prevent timely reform. To chart a new course, U.S. policymakers need only possess foresight and will.

**International incentives guarantee retrenchment**

**MacDonald and Parent 11** (Paul, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. International SecuritySpring 2011, Vol. 35, No. 4, Pages 7-44.)

This article has advanced three main arguments. First, retrenchment pessimists are incorrect when they suggest that retrenchment is an uncommon policy response to great power decline. States often curtail their commitments and mellow their ambitions as they fall in the ranks of great powers. Second and related, declining great powers react in a prompt and proportionate manner to their dwindling fortunes. They do this for the same reason that they tend to seize opportunities to expand: international incentives are strong inducements. In the high-stakes world of great power politics, states can seldom afford to fool themselves or pamper parochial interests when relative power is perilously slipping away. Third, the rate of relative decline explains not only the extent of retrenchment but also the form. The faster the rate of decline, the more likely states are to reform their militaries, increase reliance on allies, and refrain from using force in international disputes. Taken together, these findings suggest that retrenchment is an attractive strategy for dealing with great power decline. Although we make no claim that the rate of relative decline explains everything, we suggest that our study represents a solid first cut and that domestic political factors loom too large in discussions of power transitions and hegemonic change.

**MacDonald and Parent 11** (Paul, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. International SecuritySpring 2011, Vol. 35, No. 4, Pages 7-44.)

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

### Solve war

**Kagan confuses causality- U.S. power didn’t create the liberal order and isn’t key to support it**

**The Economist 12** [http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/02/world-order, “The world order, the stakes of American Hegemony,” February 2nd 2012]

IN THE latest edition of the *New Republic,* Robert Kagan, a senior fellow at Brookings and noted Kagan, serves up [a ponderous rebuttal to the proposition that America is in decline](http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI&utm_source=Editors+and+Bloggers&utm_campaign=cbaee91d9d-Edit_and_Blogs&utm_medium=email). I don't disagree with Mr Kagan that America remains, for the foreseeable future, securely hegemonic, which is the thesis he is most anxious to establish. But I am sceptical of Mr Kagan's assumptions about why American unipolarity must be so jealously protected, which he announces at the outset of his essay: The present world order—characterized by an unprecedented number of democratic nations; a greater global prosperity, even with the current crisis, than the world has ever known; and a long peace among great powers—reflects American principles and preferences, and was built and preserved by American power in all its political, economic, and military dimensions. If American power declines, this world order will decline with it. It will be replaced by some other kind of order, reflecting the desires and the qualities of other world powers. Or perhaps it will simply collapse, as the European world order collapsed in the first half of the twentieth century. The belief, held by many, that even with diminished American power “the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive,” as the political scientist G. John Ikenberry has argued, is a pleasant illusion. There is much to quibble with here. It may be that the current global dispensation to some extent "reflects American principles and preferences". If it does, however, it's not because it "was built and preserved by American power", except in a rather trivial sense. The American model of political economy has proved in many ways to be the world's most successful. As the 20th century's main rivals to capitalist liberal democracy failed, polities worldwide looked to the example of Western Europe and North America, and this led to a glad flowering of democracy and prosperity. But America didn't *cause* the world's numerous socialist and/or authoritarian experiments to fail. Those regimes faltered first and foremost because socialism and authoritarianism tend not to work out in the long run. And America didn't *compel* aspiring first-worlders to try market economies and democratic governance. The nations of the world could see for themselves what was working and, in their own ways, have mostly followed suit. If American power does wither, it will be due to America's failure to maintain really first-rate institutions. The ensuing world order would indeed become, as Mr Kagan has it, one "reflecting the desires and the qualities of other world powers". But that's simply because the capitals of the world aren't full of blithering dopes who wouldn't know what to do if Brookings senior fellows didn't tell them. Smart countries will want to emulate those that remain or have become first-rate. And, as far as I can tell, people who become accustomed to wealth and freedom don't have to be bullied and cajoled into wanting to keep it. Because they have grown rich, they'll have the means to keep it. Which is why it's absurd to think that if America loses its lustre, the peoples of the world will inevitably suffer under the dark reign of Russian or Chinese bad guys. Other wealthy, liberal democracies can have huge navies, too, if we'd let them. Mr Ikenberry's alleged "pleasant illusion" looks pleasantly solid to me. Mr Kagan gives it his all arguing that the "rise of the rest" does not mean America's not still undisputed king of the hill. But Rosa Brooks, a Georgetown law professor, [is right](http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-brooks-decline-20120201,0,149589.story) that the skyward trajectory of the BRICs does mean America's *relative* influence has waned, and that that's a happy development: [A]s Reagan recognized, a decline in relative American power is a good thing, not a bad thing — if we can turn rising states into solid allies. Remember "Gulliver's Travels"? True, it wasn't much fun for Gulliver to be the little guy in the land of Brobdingnagian giants, but it was even less fun to be a giant among the Lilliputians. Like Gulliver, America will prosper most if we can surround ourselves with friendly peer and near-peer states. They give us larger markets and improve burden-sharing; none of the global problems that bedevil us can be solved by the United States alone. The global public goods Mr Kagan rightly prizes—peace, stability, unimpeded trade routes—will be more, not less secure if the burden of their provision is more broadly distributed. And America is more likely to remain worth emulating were it to redirect some significant portion of the trillions spent maintaining its hegemony into more productive uses.

### a/t: military power (link turn)

**We’ll internal link turn all of their military power arguments-eminent military power makes all of our threats non-credible and prevents peaceful resolution to crises-a world of parity is the only way to access credible threats and military power**

**Monteiro 10** \*Nuno P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University. His research and teach­ing focuses on international relations theory and security studies. He is currently writing a book on the causes of conflict in a unipolar world. Professor Monteiro received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 2009 [http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/105216monteiro.pdf, Spring Summer 2010, “Why U.S. Does Not Deter Challenges”]

Well into the Obama presidency, the broadest foreign policy challenge facing the United States remains unmentioned. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has frequently threatened dire consequences for states that pursue policies contrary to its interests. But despite the formidable power that backs these threats, they are often ignored. When threatened with U.S. military action, Milosevic did not fold, the Taliban did not give in, nor did Saddam roll over. Similarly, Iran and North Korea continue to resist U.S. pressure to stop their nuclear programs. Despite their relative weakness vis-à-vis the world’s sole superpower, all these states defied it. In contrast, during the Cold War, U.S. threats were taken seriously by the Soviet Union, the world’s other superpower. Despite their tremendous power, the Soviets were deterred from invading Western Europe and coerced into withdrawing their missiles from Cuba. Why were U.S. threats heeded by another superpower but are now disregarded by far less powerful states? Two explanations are commonly offered. The first is that the United States is militarily overextended and needs to make more troops available or to augment its own power for its threats to be credible. The second is that while the Soviets were evil, they were also rational. The enemies of today, alas, are not. Both these views are wrong. Despite being at war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is capable of badly damaging any regime that defies it while suffering little itself. And America’s new enemies are not more “irrational” than its old ones. If U.S. threats were able to deter shoe-slamming “we will bury you” Soviet premier Khrushchev with his 3,000 intercontinental nuclear weapons, why are we unable to stop Kim Jong-Il and his handful of rudimentary warheads—not to mention Ahmadinejad, who has none? Because threats are not the problem. Deterrence and coercion do not only require credible threats that harm will follow from defiance. They require credible assurances that no harm will follow from compliance. In order for America to expect compliance with U.S. demands, it must persuade its foes that they will be punished if and only if they defy us. During the Cold War, the balance of power between the two superpowers made assurances superfluous. Any U.S. attack on the Soviet Union would prompt Moscow to retaliate, imposing catastrophic costs on America. The prospect of an unprovoked U.S. attack was therefore unthinkable. Soviet power meant Moscow knew no harm would follow from complying with U.S. demands. But in today’s world, none of our enemies has the wherewithal to retaliate. U.S. threats, backed by the most powerful military in history, are eminently credible. The problem is the very same power advantage undermines the credibility of U.S. assurances. Our enemies feel vulnerable to an American attack even if they comply with our demands. They are therefore less likely to heed them. As the world’s most powerful state, the United States must work hard to assure other states that they are not at the mercy of an unpredictable behemoth. This is particularly important in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, which many see, rightly or wrongly, as unprovoked. To make its assurances credible, the United States must restrain itself through multilateral action, a less aggressive military posture, and by pledging to eschew regime change. A failure to make American assurances credible will continue to hinder U.S. goals. As long as other regimes suspect we are bent on eliminating them even if they comply with our demands, it will be difficult to stop them from pursuing policies opposed to U.S. interests. The same old problems will persist. Iran and North Korea will maintain their nuclear programs. China and Russia will become increasingly belligerent. And Burma and Sudan will maintain policies that further already endemic human rights abuses. In sum, non-credible assurances will lead to a world in which U.S. power fails to bring about the desired results in a peaceful manner. This should come as no surprise. It follows from the unparalleled power of the United States.

**Heg kills the efficacy of threats-parity solves**

**Monteiro 11 \***Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University[http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/29/why\_we\_keep\_fighting, “Why we (Keep) Fighting,” December 29th]

These wars in Kuwait (1991), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001-present), and Iraq (2003-11) all resulted from other states not complying with U.S. demands. When threatened with U.S. military action, Slobodan Milosevic did not fold, the Taliban did not give in, nor did Saddam Hussein roll over. In contrast, the Soviet Union always took U.S. threats seriously. Despite its tremendous might, it refrained from taking West Berlin and withdrew its missiles from Cuba. Why were U.S. threats heeded by the Soviet bear but now disregarded by secondary powers? Two explanations are commonly offered. The first is that the United States is militarily overextended. The second is that while the Soviets were evil but rational, today's enemies are irrational. Both these views are wrong. The war in Afghanistan does not prevent the United States from badly damaging any non-nuclear state that defies it while suffering relatively little itself. And the U.S.'s new enemies are no less rational than its old ones. If U.S. threats were able to deter shoe-slamming "we will bury you" Khrushchev and his hundreds of intercontinental nuclear missiles, why is the United States unable to stop North Korea and its handful of rudimentary warheads -- not to mention Iran, which has none? Because threats are not the problem. Backed by the mightiest military in history, U.S. threats are eminently credible. In fact, the absence of another great power capable of deterring Washington gives the U.S. a free hand abroad. As Saddam's foreign minister Tariq Aziz lamented after Iraq's humiliating defeat in the Gulf War, "We don't have a patron anymore. If we still had the Soviets as our patron,none of this would have happened." The problem lies elsewhere. During the Cold War, mutually assured destruction kept the peace. The prospect of an unprovoked U.S. attack, which would ultimately lead to the U.S.'s own destruction, was unthinkable. But now that the Soviet Union is gone, America's enemies feel vulnerable even if they comply with Washington's demands. They know that the United States has the wherewithal to take them down if it so decides, so they are unlikely to accept any U.S. demands (to abandon a nuclear program, for example) that would leave them in a position of even greater weakness. This is what explains U.S. involvement in so many "hot" wars since the Cold War ended. As the world's sole superpower, the United States is often seen as an aggressive behemoth. To make its threats effective, we are told, it must restrain itself through a less aggressive military posture, a commitment to multilateral action, or even a pledge to eschew regime change. But even if it does all this, as long as U.S. power remains unmatched, Washington will continue to face difficulties having its way without resorting to war. This should come as no surprise. It follows from the unparalleled power of the United States.

**Counterbalancing independently causes resistance to u.s. lead**

**Ikenberry et al. 9 \***G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Michael Mastanduno is the associate professor of government at Dartmouth, William C. Wohlforth is Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University [http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world\_politics/summary/v061/61.1.ikenberry.html, “Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences, PDF, January 2009]

It has long been an axiom of social science that resources (or capabilities as defined herein) do not translate automatically into power (control over outcomes or over the behavior of other actors).28� Yet most observers regard it as similarly axiomatic that there is some positive relationship between a state’s relative capability to help or harm others and its ability to get them to do what it wants. Even if the relationship is complex, more capabilities relative to others ought to translate generally into more power and influence. By this commonsense logic, a unipole should be expected to have more influence than either of the two great powers in a bipolar system. Articles in this special issue argue that the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity may not be an unambiguous benefit for the unipole’s ability to wield influence. On the contrary, a unipolar state may face the paradoxical situation of being simultaneously more capable and more constrained. Two distinct theoretical logics suggest that a unipole might enjoy less power to shape the international system than a superpower in bipolarity.

First is the logic of balancing, alliance, and opposition, discussed in the contributions by Stephen Walt and Mastanduno. The increased concentration of capabilities in the unipole may elicit increased opposition from other states—in the form of either traditional counterbalancing or subtler soft balancing. Even if such resistance falls short of offering a real counterweight, it may materially hamstring the unipole’s ability to exercise influence. As Walt argues, the structural shift to unipolarity removed one of the major motivations for the middle-ranked great powers to defer to the United States. Mastanduno offers a similar argument: the collapse of a unifying central threat signifies that in this post–cold war era the United States has less control over adjustment struggles with its principal economic partners, because it can no longer leverage their security dependence to dictate international economic outcomes. Globalization reinforces this U.S. predicament by expanding the number of relevant players in the world economy and by offering them alternatives to economic reliance on the United States. While under bipolarity the propensity of other middle powers to defer to the United States was structurally favored, under unipolarity the opposite may obtain. Even if observable balancing behavior reminiscent of bipolarity or multipolarity never occurs, a structurally induced tendency of the middle-ranked great powers to withhold cooperation may sap the unipole’s effective power.

**This proves that hegemony can never solve wars because the u.s. becomes overstretched and unable to commit focus everywhere**

**Walt 9** \* Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University [http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world\_politics/summary/v061/61.1.walt.html, January 2009, Volume 61 Issue 9]

A final feature of unipolarity is the tendency for the unipole to be distracted by a wide array of foreign policy problems. If the unipole chooses to try and mold the system to its liking or to play an active role as the residual provider of collective goods, then it will inevitably be involved in many issues and will find it difficult to keep its attention focused on any single one. For instance, the U.S. invasion of Iraq gave North Korea the opportunity to advance its nuclear ambitions, and the current U.S. preoccupation with the war on terror has made it easier for China to expand its influence in Asia.34 Weaker states, by contrast, will focus their attention on a small number of vital problems, including efforts to manipulate the unipolar power. Thus, although there is much to be said for being number one, being the dominant power also entails a number of pitfalls.35

### soft balancing thumper

**Heg causes soft balancing**

**Pape 5** \***Robert Pape** is professor of political science at the University of Chicago. His current work focuses on American grand strategy, causes and solutions to suicide terrorism, the logic of soft balancing in a unipolar world, and the limits and advantages of precision air power [http://mershoncenter.osu.edu/events/09-10%20events/Sept09/papesept09.htm, International Security Summer 2005, Vol. 30, No. 1: 7–45]

The international image of the United States as a benign superpower is declining, particularly with regard to the aspects that are likely to erode its relative immunity to balance of power dynamics. Without the perception of benign intent, a unipolar leader’s intervention in regions beyond its own, especially those with substantial economic value, is likely to produce incentives among the world’s other major powers to balance against it. That the United States does not pose an imminent threat to attack any major power is not sufficient to prevent these incentives, because the main danger for second-ranked states is that the United States would pose an indirect threat or evolve from a unipolar leader into an unrestrained global hegemon. In a unipolar world, the response to an expansionist unipolar leader is likely to be global balancing.

**Makes effective hegemony impossible and multipoliarity inevitable in the long run**

**Pape 5** \***Robert Pape** is professor of political science at the University of Chicago. His current work focuses on American grand strategy, causes and solutions to suicide terrorism, the logic of soft balancing in a unipolar world, and the limits and advantages of precision air power [http://mershoncenter.osu.edu/events/09-10%20events/Sept09/papesept09.htm, International Security Summer 2005, Vol. 30, No. 1: 7–45]

The Strategy of Soft Balancing Balancing is about equalizing the odds in a contest between the strong and the weak. States balance when they take action intended to make it hard for strong states to use their military advantage against others. The goal can be to deter a strong state from attacking or to reduce its prospects of victory in war. Traditional hard balancing seeks to change the military balance in an actual or (more often) potential conºict by contributing military capabilities to the weaker side through measures such as a military buildup, war-ªghting alliance, or transfer of military technology to an ally.

How soft balancing works

States can also seek to equalize the odds through soft balancing. Balancing can involve the utilization of tools to make a superior state’s military forces harder to use without directly confronting that state’s power with one’s own forces. Although soft balancing relies on nonmilitary tools, it aims to have a real, if indirect, effect on the military prospects of a superior state. Mechanisms of soft balancing include territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signaling of resolve to participate in a balancing coalition. All of these steps can weaken the military power that the superior state can bring to bear in battle.59

Territorial denial.

Superior states often benefit from access to the territory of third parties as staging areas for ground forces or as transit for air and naval forces. Denying access to this territory can reduce the superior state’s prospects for victory, such as by increasing the logistical problems for the superior state or compelling it to fight with air or sea power alone, constraints that effectively reduce the overall force that a stronger state can bring to bear against a weaker one.

Entangling diplomacy.

Even strong states do not have complete freedom to ignore either the rules and procedures of important international organizations or accepted diplomatic practices without losing substantial support for their objectives. Accordingly, states may use international institutions and ad hoc diplomatic maneuvers to delay a superior state’s plan for war and so reduce the element of surprise and give the weaker side more time to prepare; delay may even make the issue irrelevant. Especially if the superior state is also a democracy, entangling diplomacy works not only by affecting the balance of military capabilities that can be brought to bear in the dispute but also by strengthening domestic opposition to possible adventures within the superior state.

Economic strengthening.

Militarily strong, threatening states that are the targets of balancing efforts usually derive their military superiority from possession of great economic strength. One way of balancing effectively, at least in the long run, would be to shift relative economic power in favor of the weaker side. The most obvious way of doing this is through regional trading blocs that increase trade and economic growth for members while directing trade away from nonmembers. If the superior state can be excluded from the most important such blocs, its overall trade and growth rates may suffer over time.

Signals of resolve to balance.

Second-ranked powers seeking to act collectively against a sole superpower confront intense concern that the needed collective action will not materialize. Soft balancing, in addition to its direct usefulness in restraining aggression by a unipolar leader, may also address this problem by helping to coordinate expectations of mutual balancing behavior. If multiple states can cooperate, repeatedly, in some of the types of measures listed above, they may gradually increase their trust in each other’s willingness to cooperate against the unipolar leader’s ambitions. Thus, a core purpose of soft balancing is not to coerce or even to impede the superior state’s current actions, but to demonstrate resolve in a manner that signals a commitment to resist the superpower’s future ambitions. Accordingly, the measure of success for soft balancing is not limited to whether the sole superpower abandons specific policies, but also includes whether more states join a softbalancing coalition against the unipolar leader.

### 2nc-escalation trick

**Wars won’t go nuclear if the u.s. isn’t the hegemon because we won’t intervene**

**Gholz et al. 97** \*Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press are doctoral candidates in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Harvey M. Sapolsky is Professor of Public Policy and Organization in the Department of Political Science at M.I.T. and Director of the M.I.T. Defense and Arms Control Studies (DACS) Program. This paper began as a project for the DACS Working Group on Defense Politics [Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring, 1997), pp. 5-48, PDF]

THE INCREASED CHANCE OF GREAT POWER WAR Several prominent analysts favor a policy of selective engagement.70 These analysts fear that American military retrenchment would increase the risk of great power war. A great power war today would be a calamity, even for those countries that manage to stay out of the fighting. The best way to prevent great power war, according to these analysts, is to remain engaged in Europe and East Asia. Twice in this century the United States has pulled out of Europe, and both times great power war followed. Then America chose to stay engaged, and the longest period of European great power peace ensued. In sum, selective engagers point to the costs of others' great power wars and the relative ease of preventing them. The selective engagers' strategy is wrong for two reasons. First, selective engagers overstate the effect of U.S. military presence as a positive force for great power peace. In today's world, disengagement will not cause great power war, and continued engagement will not reliably prevent it. In some circum- stances, engagement may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Second, selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate the costs and risks of their strategies. Overseas deployments require a large force structure. Even worse, selective engagement will ensure that when a future great power war erupts, the United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars are bad for America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight. Selective engagers overstate America's effect on the likelihood of future great power wars. There is little reason to believe that withdrawal from Europe or Asia would lead to deterrence failures. With or without a forward U.S. pres- ence, America's major allies have sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressors. Conflict is far more likely to erupt from a sequence described in the spiral model. The danger of spirals leading to war in East Asia is remote. Spirals happen when states, seeking security, frighten their neighbors. The risk of spirals is great when offense is easier than defense, because any country's attempt to achieve security will give it an offensive capability against its neighbors. The neighbors' attempts to eliminate the vulnerability give them fleeting offensive capabilities and tempt them to launch preventive war.71 But Asia, as discussed earlier, is blessed with inherent defensive advantages. Japan and Taiwan are islands, which makes them very difficult to invade. China has a long land border with Russia, but enjoys the protection of the East China Sea, which stands between it and Japan. The expanse of Siberia gives Russia, its ever- trusted ally, strategic depth. South Korea benefits from mountainous terrain which would channel an attacking force from the north. Offense is difficult in East Asia, so spirals should not be acute. In fact, no other region in which great powers interact offers more defensive advantage than East Asia. The prospect for spirals is greater in Europe, but continued U.S. engagement does not reduce that danger; rather, it exacerbates the risk. A West European military union, controlling more than 21 percent of the world's GDP, may worry Russia. But NATO, with 44 percent of the world's GDP, is far more threatening, especially if it expands eastward. The more NATO frightens Rus- sia, the more likely it is that Russia will turn dangerously nationalist, redirect its economy toward the military, and try to re-absorb its old buffer states.72 But if the U.S. military were to withdraw from Europe, even Germany, Europe's strongest advocate for NATO expansion, might become less enthusiastic, be- cause it would be German rather than American troops standing guard on the new borders. Some advocates of selective engagement point to the past fifty years as evidence that America's forward military presence reduces the chance of war. The Cold War's great power peace, however, was overdetermined. Nuclear weapons brought a powerful restraining influence.73 Furthermore, throughout the Cold War, European and Asian powers had a common foe which encour- aged them to cooperate. After an American withdrawal, the Japanese, Koreans, and Russians would still have to worry about China; the Europeans would still need to keep an eye on Russia. These threats can be managed without U.S. assistance, and the challenge will encourage European and Asian regional cooperation. In fact, some evidence suggests that America's overseas presence was not the principal cause of great power peace during the Cold War; nuclear weapons and the presence of a unifying threat played a greater role. The Sino-Soviet dispute has been one of the bitterest in the world since the 1960s. The Soviets and Chinese have had all the ingredients for a great power war-border disputes, hostile ideologies, and occasional military clashes along their fron- tier-yet they managed to keep things from getting out of hand. Maybe the presence of nuclear weapons damped the conflict; maybe having a common foe (the United States) tempered their hostility toward each other. But it is clear that U.S. engagement was not necessary for peaceful great power relations during the Cold War. Some analysts agree that the probability of great power wars stemming from American withdrawal is very low, but they still advocate engagement because they fear low-probability, high-cost events. A war would be a human tragedy, the environment would suffer, and international trade would be disrupted. But the costs of distant great power wars must be compared to the costs of the strategy intended to prevent them. Advocates of selective engagement argue that their policy's costs are small.74 We disagree with this assessment. Two costs are associated with selective en- gagement and both are high: the cost of maintaining forces in Europe and Asia and the risk that, with engagement, the United States will have to fight a war. Maintaining substantial military power in Europe and Asia and the capability to surge forces to the Persian Gulf will require most of America's current mili- tary assets, a two-MRC force. Any savings from force cuts will be marginal.75 The larger long-term cost of selective engagement is the risk of involvement in faraway great power wars. Great power conflicts will continue to be a rare occurrence, but when they happen, the United States is much better off staying as far away from the combatants as possible. World War II resulted in the deaths of 400,000 Americans, many times that number wounded, and nearly 40 percent of GDP devoted to defense (compared to 4 percent today).76 A new great power conflict, with the possibility of nuclear use, might exact even higher costs from the participants. World War II was fought to prevent the consolidation of Europe and Asia by hostile, fanatical adversaries, but a new great power war would not raise that specter. The biggest cost of selective engagement is the risk of being drawn into someone else's faraway great power war. The global economy may be disrupted by war, depending on who is in- volved, but even in the worst case, the costs would be manageable. Trade accounts for roughly 20 percent of the American economy,77 and sudden, forced autarky would be devastating for American prosperity. But no great power war could come close to forcing American autarky: essentially all goods have substitute sources of supply at varying marginal increases in cost. Furthermore, wars never isolate the fighting countries completely from external trade. Some dislocation is a real possibility, but these short-term costs would not justify the risks of fighting a great power war. The risk of nuclear escalation is a reason to worry about great power war, but it is a highly suspect reason to favor a military policy that puts U.S. forces between feuding great powers. Nuclear weapons may not be used in a future great power war; the fear of retaliation should breed great caution on the part of the belligerents.78 But the larger point is that the possibility of a faraway **nuclear exchange is precisely the reason** that America should keep its military forces out of other country's disputes.79 An Indo-Pakistani nuclear war would be a terrible thing, but it makes no sense to get in the middle. Distant wars would be costly, but not nearly as costly as the solution that selective engagers propose. Five decades ago, America's leaders asked the people to defend the world from Soviet military power. Admirably, Americans rose to the occasion. But now they are being asked to shoulder a dangerous new burden: to protect the great powers from themselves. Before undertaking this costly and dangerous "social science experiment," Americans should look closely at the costs of engagement, the prospects for success, and the risks if things go awry Careful comparison shows restraint to be the better strategy.

### 1nc-stats/empirics

**No transition wars:**

**Only one transition war in history**

**Macdonald and Parent 11** (Paul, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. International Security Spring 2011, Vol. 35, No. 4, Pages 7-44.)

Based on our universe of cases, the predictions of retrenchment pessimists receive little support. In contrast to arguments that retrenchment is rare, we find that great powers facing acute relative decline adopted retrenchment in at least eleven and at most fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. By any accounting, a majority of the countries in these cases retrenched shortly after their ordinal transition. Nor does the evidence support the view that domestic interests constrain retrenchment. Every one of the great powers in our sample that chose to retrench did so within five years of the ordinal transition. This suggests timely responses to external constraints rather than domestic intransigence. Moreover, there does not appear to be a strong connection between regime type and retrenchment. Democracies account for about two-thirds of the great powers in our study, and are slightly more likely to face acute relative declines, accounting for thirteen of our eighteen cases, or 72 percent. Of the twelve democracies, seven retrenched, two did not, and three are debatable, yielding parameters from 58 to 83 percent. There are only three cases of autocracy, which makes comparison among groups difficult, but of these, two retrenched and one case is arguable, producing a range of 67–100 percent.59 In short, evidence at the coarse-grained level tentatively supports the neorealist approach outlined above: during acute relative decline, a significant majority of great powers of differing regime types elected to retrench. Wars, preventive or otherwise, do not appear to be a common fate for declining states, and recovery of lost rank was fairly frequent. Declining great powers found themselves embroiled in an interstate war in only four of the eighteen cases, and in **only one** of these cases—1935 United Kingdom—did the declining power go to war with the power that had just surpassed it in ordinal rank.60 In addition, in six of fifteen cases, declining great powers that adopted a policy of retrenchment managed to rebound, eventually recovering their ordinal rank from the state that surpassed them. These findings suggest that retrenching states rarely courted disaster and occasionally regained their prior position. Further, even if retrenchment was not successful, this does not prove that a preferable policy existed.61 In many cases of decline, there are few restorative solutions available; politics is often a game of unpalatable alternatives. Short of a miracle, it is hard to say what great powers such as Britain, France, or the Soviet Union could have done to stay aloft, even with the benefit of hindsight.

**15 cases it worked**

**Parent and MacDonald 11** (Joseph M. Parent is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Paul K. MacDonald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward” http://www.ihavenet.com/World-United-States-The-Wisdom-of-Retrenchment-America-Must-Cut-Back-to-Move-Forward-Foreign-Affairs.html)

Even if a policy of retrenchment were possible to implement, would it work? **The historical record suggests it would**. Since 1870, there have been 18 cases in which a great power slipped in the rankings, as measured by its GDP relative to those of other great powers. Fifteen of those declining powers implemented some form of retrenchment. Far from inviting aggression, this policy resulted in those states' being more likely to avoid militarized disputes and to recover their former rank than the three declining great powers that did not adopt retrenchment: France in the 1880s, Germany in the 1930s, and Japan in the 1990s. Those states never recovered their former positions, unlike almost half of the 15 states that did retrench, including, for example, Russia in the 1880s and the United Kingdom in the first decade of the twentieth century.

### Econ

**Economic collapse leads to war**

**a.) History**

**Ferguson 06—**prof of history, Harvard and Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution (Niall, “The Next War of the World,” September/October 2006, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/09/the\_next\_war\_of\_the\_world.html)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

b.) Studies

Miller 2k – economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank (Morris, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?”)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. **After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries** in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the **conventional wisdom** about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

No risk of an impact – stability and cooperation will only increase

Barnett 09, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine, columnist for World Politics Review, (Thomas P.M. “The New Rules: The Good News on the Global Financial Downturn,” World Politics Review, 5/25/09 <http://dan92024.blogstream.com/v1/date/200905.html>)

When the global financial contagion kicked in last fall, the blogosphere was quick to predict that a sharp uptick in global instability would soon follow. While we're not out of the woods yet, it's interesting to note just how little instability -- and not yet a single war -- has actually resulted from the worst global economic downturn since the Great Depression.

Run a Google search for "global instability" and you'll get 23 million hits. But when it comes to actual conflicts, the world is humming along at a level that reflects the steady decline in wars -- by 60 percent -- that we've seen since the Cold War's end. As George Mason University's Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) notes, that trend applies within the Muslim world, too, so even America's "war on terror" has not quite lived up to the pessimists' expectations.

Wikipedia's page for "ongoing conflicts" cites a whopping seven wars with annual death rates of 1,000-plus. And they're all familiar situations:

Arabs-Israel, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan and Mexico. None have been helped by the financial crisis, but all predate it. Iraq's internal situation has actually improved, despite slumping oil revenue. And as for fears that Mexico might soon become a "failed state," that government's recent response to the swine flu indicates otherwise.

The CSP's database lists only three new conflicts since 2008 -- Russia-Georgia, Kenya and southern Sudan. None can be blamed on the global economy. Meanwhile, Colombia's internal security has improved dramatically, and Sri Lanka's stubborn separatist movement just collapsed.

Yes, we suffer from Somali piracy, and American and Chinese subs continue their cat-and-mouse games off China's otherwise quiet coast. Still, many expected more from a financial panic that, according to the IMF, erased roughly 6 percent of global GDP: Beijing and Washington locking horns, for instance, instead of letting Taiwan negotiate peace with the mainland.

But disappointment abounds for the doom-and-gloomers:

- Instead of coming apart at the seams, China implemented a stimulus package that seems to be working at home and abroad (see America's construction industry exports). Beijing's flagship companies have exploited the crisis for the extraordinary buying opportunities it has created, locking in long-term commodity and energy contracts in exchange for much-needed cash. Meanwhile its central bank has swapped $100 billion worth of currency with major trade partners.

- Asia's big powers should be at each other's throats over sea-based energy deposits, or at least over North Korea. And yet recently we've witnessed the first China-Japan-South Korea summit, followed soon after by the creation of a $120-billion liquidity fund to help out their smaller neighbors.

- India's Congress Party just won a decisive victory in national elections, allowing it to rule without relying on anti-globalizing elements like its native Communist party. Expect another young Gandhi to champion India's next round of reforms.

- The EU definitely regrets its fast integration of all those now-shaky Eastern European economies. And yet, as Washington Post economic columnist Steve Pearlstein recently noted, ". . . the real story in Europe may be how firmly market liberalization seems to have taken hold. Not only have there been few, if any, calls for renationalizations, but some countries are still moving toward privatization and reregulation. Instances of protectionism are outweighed by the examples of cross-border mergers and acquisitions that have been accepted as a matter of course . . ."

- In the Middle East, the Arab world's biggest state, Egypt, remains committed to opening up its state-heavy economy even more, while Arab sovereign wealth funds continue their aggressive investment in Africa, where China and India's portfolios also grow.- In Latin America, market-friendly forces (e.g., Brazil's Lula) are gaining steam, while market-hostile ones (e.g., Venezuela's Chávez) lose traction.

- Even "axis of diesel" Russia has quieted down considerably over the past nine months, with Vladimir Putin's hand-picked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, slowly emerging as a force of level-headed moderation.

Add it all up and it's clear that assessments such as "the world is in chaos" -- a David Rothkopf beauty -- just don't fly. Periodic riots do not an Armageddon make.

Instead, this crisis has elicited unprecedented cooperation among the world's great powers on both coordinated stimulus spending and making intermarket financial flows more transparent (keep an eye on the IMF). It's also triggered awareness of the need for an additional global reserve currency to help the euro balance the dollar (a convertible renminbi would help).

### Resource wars

**Empirical Evidence**

**Salehyan 07** – Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas. (Idean, 6-14 “The New Myth About Climate Change Corrupt, tyrannical governments—not changes in the Earth’s climate—will be to blame for the coming resource wars.” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/08/13/the_new_myth_about_climate_change>)

First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters

**No risk of a conflict – countries share resources and it is not the root cause of any conflict**

**Victor 07**— professor of law at Stanford Law School and the director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development. He is also a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (David, Nov 14, “What resource wars?” <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/IK14Dj04.html>) Jacome

such as malaria that could be harder to contain if tropical conditions are more prevalent, which in turn could stress health-care systems and lead to hot wars.

While there are many reasons to fear global warming, the risk that such dangers could cause violent conflict ranks extremely low on the list because it is highly unlikely to materialize. Despite decades of warnings about water wars, what is striking is that water wars don't happen - usually because countries that share water resources have a lot more at stake and armed conflict rarely fixes the problem. Some analysts have pointed to conflicts over resources, including water and valuable land, as a cause in the Rwandan genocide, for example. Recently, the UN secretary-general suggested that climate change was already exacerbating the conflicts in Sudan.

But none of these supposed causal chains stay linked under close scrutiny - the conflicts over resources are usually symptomatic of deeper failures in governance and other primal forces for conflicts, such as ethnic tensions, income inequalities and other unsettled grievances. Climate is just one of many factors that contribute to tension. The same is true for scenarios of climate refugees, where the moniker "climate" conveniently obscures the deeper causal forces.

Their impacts are self-denying—states too weak to adapt to scarcity are also too weak to fight

**Barnett 2k –** Australian Research Council Fellow in the School of Social and Environmental Enquiry at the University of (Jon, Melbourne, Review of International Studies 26, April)

This brings us to a pervasive analytical difficulty of the literature which posits the possibility of environmentally induced conflicts. If, as Gleick suggests, ‘developing countries have far fewer technical and economic resources at their disposal’, and hence are less able to adapt to environmental change, then this institutional impoverishment surely applies to their ability to wage war as well.15 The threat from the South could scarcely manifest itself as large scale warfare, despite Gleick’s observation that ‘Third World arms capabilities are impressive and growing’ and so ‘the threat to peace and security becomes fully apparent’.16 There may indeed be some possibility of low-intensity conflict driven by desperation and resentment of the policies and practices of the North, but it is important to step back and view the broader picture. The revealing question is whose peace and security? The absolute peace and security problem is not that in the face of intolerable oppression the oppressed may resist; the problem is the oppression and injustice itself. The task, then, is to eliminate this injustice.

### Food wars

**Tech development solves**

**Thompson 5/13/11 –** Dr. Robert L. Thompson is a senior fellow for The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and professor emeritus at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. “Proving Malthus Wrong, Sustainable agriculture in 2050” <http://scienceblogs.com/tomorrowstable/2011/05/proving_malthus_wrong_sustaina.php>

Tools available today, including plant breeding and biotechnology, can make presently unusable soils productive and increase the genetic potential of individual crops - enhancing drought and stress tolerance, for example - while also producing gains in yields. Existing tools can also internalize plants' resistance to disease, and even improve a plant's nutritional content - meaning consumers can get more nutritional value without increasing their consumption. Furthermore, modern high-productivity agriculture minimizes farmers' impact on the environment. Failure to embrace these technologies will result in further destruction of remaining forests. Adoption of technologies that produce more output from fewer resources has been hugely successful from an economic standpoint: prior to the price spike in 2008, there was a 150-year downward trend in the real price of food. The jury is still out on whether the long-term downward trend will resume, prices will flatten out on a new higher plateau, or they will trend upward in the future. The key is investing in research in the public and private sectors to increase agricultural productivity faster than global demand grows. Long ago, British scholar Thomas Malthus predicted that the human population would eventually outgrow its ability to feed itself. However, Malthus has been proven wrong for more than two centuries precisely because he underestimated the power of agricultural research and technology to increase productivity faster than demand. There is no more reason for Malthus to be right in the 21st century than he was in the 19th or 20th - but only if we work to support, not impede, continued agricultural research and adoption of new technologies around the world.

**Empirically denied – human development solves**

**Wish 10** – writer for Allianz (study of demographics) (Vladish “Who’s Afraid of Thomas Malthus?” Global |01 October 2010by Valdis Wish <http://knowledge.allianz.com/?224>

None of the troubling predictions about overpopulation and global starvation have come to pass. So should we still be worried about too many people on Earth? The specter of too many people and not enough food has haunted scientists and philosophers since at least the time of Aristotle. The most famous is Thomas Malthus, who in 1798 grimly predicted that population growth would outpace food production, resulting in human death and misery. The Industrial Revolution and new agricultural techniques during the 19th century, however, helped prevent a major global starvation. Over 150 years later, Paul R. Ehrlich published a bestselling book called "The Population Bomb," in which he projected the starvation of hundreds of millions during the 1970s-80s. While the world saw some devastating famines during those decades—in Bangladesh and Ethiopia, for example—they were not on the global scale that Ehrlich had predicted. But even after **history proved Malthus and Ehrlich wrong**, theories about the dangers of overpopulation still capture the public interest. Jared Diamond, author of the bestseller "Collapse", says humanity still faces a perilous "population explosion" in the coming decades. His book describes the bloody events in Rwanda, one of the world's most densely populated countries, during the 1990s to illustrate what can happen when population growth converges with problems like environmental degradation and food shortages. Diffusing the population bomb Malthus, Ehrlich, and Diamond all have their critics, mainly economists and theorists who deny that population growth negatively affects quality of life. One of them is U.S. political economist Nicholas Eberstadt, who argues that overpopulation alone is not to blame for poor living conditions. Global living standards, he notes, have improved dramatically during the 20th century despite a near-quadrupling of the human population. "In most people's minds, the notions of 'overpopulation,' 'overcrowding,' or 'too many people' are associated with images of hungry children, unchecked disease, squalid living conditions, and awful slums," writes Eberstadt. "But the proper name for those conditions is human poverty." Countries like Taiwan, South Korea, or the Netherlands show that densely populated countries can prosper as well. Nonetheless, concerns that population growth obstructs development have inspired large-scale family planning measures since the 1950s. In 1969, the UN created the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), which supports family planning initiatives worldwide. In the late 1970s, the Chinese government introduced its famous one-child-per-family policy. While many question whether such schemes are humane, the policy clearly slowed down Chinese population growth to the extent that India will soon be the world's most populous country.

#### Second is M screw – co2 solves methane emissions which cause warming

**Carter 1-10 –** Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) (January 2012, “Environmental Stresses and Plant Methane Emissions”http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2012/jan/10jan2012a4.html) Jacome

Concluding from a review of the scientific literature that "aerobic CH4 [methane] emissions from plants may be affected by O2 stress or any other stress leading to ROS [reactive oxygen species] production," authors Wang *et al*. (2009) sought to determine whether physical injury would also affect CH4 emissions from plants. Their work revealed that "physical injury (cutting) stimulated CH4 emissions from fresh twigs of *Artemisia* species under aerobic conditions," and that "more cutting resulted in more CH4 emissions," as did hypoxia in both cut and uncut *Artemisia frigida* twigs.

In discussing their findings, and those of previous studies that suggest, in their words, "that a variety of environmental stresses stimulate CH4 emission from a wide variety of plant species," Wang *et al*. concluded that "global change processes, including climate change, depletion of stratospheric ozone, increasing ground-level ozone, spread of plant pests, and land-use changes, could cause more stress in plants on a global scale, potentially stimulating more CH4 emission globally," while further concluding that "the role of stress in plant CH4 production in the global CH4 cycle could be important in a changing world."

Several things "could" be important in this regard, but the ongoing rise in the air's CO2 content is hard at work *countering* stress-induced CH4 emissions. Environmental stresses of all types do indeed generate highly-reactive oxygenated compounds that damage plants, but atmospheric CO2 enrichment typically boosts the production of antioxidant enzymes that *scavenge* and *detoxify* those highly-reactive oxygenated compounds. Thus, it can be appreciated that the historical rise in the air's CO2 content should have gradually been *alleviating* the level of stress experienced by Earth's plants; and this phenomenon should have been gradually *reducing* the rate at which the planet's vegetation releases CH4 to the atmosphere. In addition, it should have been doing it at *an accelerating rate* commensurate with the accelerating rate of the upward trend in the air's CO2 content.

Wang *et al*.'s way of thinking therefore suggests that the air's CH4 concentration should be *rising ever faster*, as "global change processes" lead to more plant stress, more ROS production in plants, and more CH4 emissions from Earth's vegetation, whereas a conflicting hypothesis suggests that the air's CH4 concentration should be *rising ever slower*, as higher concentrations of atmospheric CO2 lead to less plant stress, more antioxidants that scavenge and detoxify ROS in plants, and less CH4 emissions from Earth's vegetation.

So which view is winning? A quick glance at the atmosphere's recent methane history - shown below - provides the answer.

*Figure 1. Trace gas mole fractions of methane (CH4) as measured at Mauna Loa, Hawaii. Adapted from Schnell and Dlugokencky (2008).*

As can be seen from this figure, the rate of increase in atmospheric methane abundance has steadily declined since the late 1980s, with near-zero increase from 1999 through the end of the record. Is the ongoing rise in the air's CO2 content responsible for knocking its biggest greenhouse-gas competitor (other than water vapor) entirely out of the picture with respect to *future* global warming? Or, will further increases in CO2 emissions actually cause the atmosphere's methane concentration to *decline* and thereby begin to counteract its (CO2's) *own* warming effect. Only time will tell.

#### Third are Natural Aerosols

**Carter 11**, Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) [“Climate Change Reconsidered 2011 Interim Report,” September, Science and Environmental Policy Project, Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Published by The Heartland Institute]

In a contemporaneous study of aerosols, Carslaw et al. (2010) write, ―the natural environment is a major source of atmospheric aerosols, including dust, secondary organic material from terrestrial biogenic emissions, carbonaceous particles from wildfires, and sulphate from marine phytoplankton dimethyl sulphide emissions.‖ These aerosols ―have a significant effect on many components of the Earth system, such as the atmospheric radiative balance and photosynthetically available radiation entering the biosphere, the supply of nutrients to the ocean, and the albedo of snow and ice. With this background in mind, the authors reviewed ―the impact of these natural systems on atmospheric aerosols based on observations and models, including the potential for long term changes in emissions and feedbacks on climate.‖ Based on their review, the seven scientists report, ―the number of drivers of change is very large and the various systems are strongly coupled,‖ noting ―there have therefore been very few studies that integrate the various effects to estimate climate feedback factors.‖ However, they add, ―available observations and model studies suggest that the regional radiative perturbations are potentially several watts per square meter due to changes in these natural aerosol emissions in a future climate,‖ which is **equivalent to the magnitude of climate forcing projected** to result from increases in greenhouse gases but typically of the opposite sign.